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ISSUE PRESENTED 
Whether judge Sawaya committed reversible error in 
ruling as a matter of law that res ipsa loquitur is not 
applicable and in granting hospital's Motion for Summary Judgment 
because Robinson failed to support her cl^im of medical 
malpractice with expert testimony and to establish with expert 
testimony that res ipsa loquitur was appropriate. 
STATEMENT OF THE CA^E 
A. Nature of the Case. This is a medical malpractice 
action in which plaintiff-appellant Amy G. Robinson ("Robinson") 
seeks damages for injuries caused by an infection which she 
allegedly received while being treated at the LDS Hospital 
("hospital"). 
B. Proceedings and Disposition Below. On January lf 
1983 Robinson filed a summons and complaint upon hospital 
alleging that while being treated at hospital for a tonsillectomy 
she was infected at the site of a needle Injection. Robinson's 
complaint declared that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur was 
applicable (R. at 2). One year later, on March 20f 1984 hospital 
moved for summary judgment on the grounds that plaintiff was 
unable to establish her claims through expert medical 
testimony. Hospital's motion was supported by expert medical 
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testimony that Robinson had the infection in her body before she 
came into hospital and that hospital was not responsible for the 
injuries complained of (R. at 87, 97). Robinson failed to submit 
competent contradictory testimony. judge James S. Sawaya of the 
Third Judicial District Court of Salt Lake County ruled that the 
theory of res ipsa loquitur was not appropriate and granted 
summary judgment with thirty days leave for Robinson to show that 
she could establish her claims through expert testimony (R. at 
157). 
On July 25 Robinson moved the court for an extension of 
time in which to provide expert testimony, claiming that an out 
of state witness was reviewing the matter and that additional 
time was needed to prepare a report. One month later Robinson 
withdrew the expert and stipulated to summary judgment (R. at 
160, 164). On August 27, 1984 summary judgment was entered and 
Robinson's complaint was dismissed with prejudice for failure to 
obtain expert testimony in support of her claims ( R. at 166). 
C. Statement of Facts. on March 18, 1982, Robinson 
was admitted to hospital for a tonsillectomy which was performed 
the following day without incident. Robinson was discharged froii 
hospital on the morning of March 20, 1982 (R. at 3). The 
following day Robinson was readmitted for treatment of septic 
shock caused by an infection in her left buttocks. The infectioi 
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was located in an area where injections had been given during her 
hospitalization the day before (R. at 4)+ 
The infected portion of Robinson's left buttocks was 
surgically removed and tissue samples were sent to hospital's 
laboratory and found to be positive for Beta Streptococcus Group 
"A". The final diagnosis was that Robin$on's septic shock was 
caused by a Beta Streptococcus Group "A" infection at the 
injection site in her left buttocks (R. 3t 4 and 99). 
Three physicians, Dr. Elvon G. Jackson who performed 
the tonsillectomy, Dr. Harold S. Cole whd conducted the 
subsequent emergency room examination and Dr. John p. Burke 
director of the hospital's division of infectious disease, 
initially thought that the infection may have been introduced by 
a needle. Drs. Jackson, Cole, and Burke (modified this evaluation 
when Robinson was thoroughly tested and it was discovered that 
tissues from Robinson's tonsils were also infected with a Beta 
Group "A" bacteria (R. at 98-100). Dr. BJurke's ultimate opinion 
was that the buttocks infection was probably caused by a pre-
existing tonsillar infection which Robinson brought into the 
hospital (R. at 100). Dr. Jackson's finafL opinion was that 
Robinson's injury was not caused by the negligence of the 
hospital (R. at 174, p.34 para. 1-4). Dr. Cole's decisive 
testimony was that he did not have enough) information to 
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formulate an opinion as to what the probable cause of Robinson's 
injury was (R. at 178/ p.13 para. 1-8). 
As part of hospital's investigation to locate the 
source of the streptococcus infection, cultures were taken from 
the three nurses who administered injections to Robinson and 
tissues from Robinson's excised tonsils were examined by 
hospital's laboratory. These tests positively showed that the 
three nurses were not infected with Beta Streptococcus Group "A" 
(R. at 98). 
Hospital also investigated the method and manner in 
which each of the injections had been packaged and 
administered. It was determined that each injection was a 
prepackaged single lot injection administered according to 
hospital protocol, applicable standards of care ana procedures to 
ensure sterility (R. at 99-106). 
At summary judgment Dr. Burke's affidavit testimony was 
that Robinson had the bacteria in her tonsils at the time of her 
admission to hospital on March 18, 1983 and that this bacteria 
spread from Robinson's throat to the injection site, either 
through her bloodstream or by Robinson or someone slse handling 
the injection site (R. at 99, 100). 
Robinson testified that on two occasions following her 
tonsillectomy and prior to her discharge from hospital, her 
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husband climbed into bed with her and "touched me all over" (R. 
at 175, p.57, para. 2). 
Over two years following Robihson's hospitalization 
and over one year following the initiation of this suit, hospital 
moved for dismissal on the basis of Dr. purke's testimony and 
Robinson's failure to provide a conflicting expert opinion. 
Judge Sawaya granted summary judgment an<£ dismissed Robinson's 
complaint with prejudice on the grounds that Robinson failed to 
introduce expert medical testimony to establish that her injuries 
were caused by substandard hospital care^ Judge Sawaya also ruled 
that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur w^s not applicable in this 
case (R. at 158-159). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
In medical malpractice actions plaintiffs are required 
to introduce expert testimony to establish (1) the standard of 
care, (2) defendant's failure to comply With that standard and 
(3) that the action of the defendant caused the injuries. In 
opposition to hospital's motion for summary judgment, Robinson 
introduced no expert testimony that her ijnfection was caused by 
hospital's breach of the appropriate standard of care. Instead, 
Robinson argued, as she does now, that sh|e was entitled to take 
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her case to trial merely because she had plead that res ipsa 
loquitur was applicable. 
Res ipsa loquitur is not applicable in this case 
because Robinson failed to introduce expert testimony that her 
infection was more likely the result of hospital's negligence 
than some other cause and because whether her infection was the 
result of hospital's negligence is not an issue within the common 
knowledge of laymen. 
Hospital, on the other hand introduced testimony from 
an infectious disease specialist that hospital was not 
responsible for plaintiff's injury and that plaintiff was 
infected with the bacteria before entering the hospital. 
Furthermore, it has generally been held that the doctrine of res 
ipsa loquitur is not applicable in injection-related infection 
cases such as this. 
Summary judgment is the time for parties to establish 
that they can prove their case at trial. By failing to establish 
through expert testimony that res ipsa loquitur was applicable or 
by showing that the issue of negligence was within the common 
knowledge of laymen, Robinson subjected her claim to summary 
dismissal. judge Sawaya was correct in ruling, as a matter of 
law, that there were no material issues in dispute as to whether 
Robinson's injuries were caused by hospital's negligence. 
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ARGUMENT 
JUDGE SAWAYA ACTED APPROPRIATELY IN DISMISSING 
ROBINSON'S COMPLAINT FOR FAILURE TO SUPPORT HER CLAIM OF 
MEDICAL MALPRACTICE WITH EXPERT TESTIMONY AND FOR 
FAILURE TO ESTABLISH THAT RES IPSA LOQUITUR WAS 
APPROPRIATE 
Judge Sawaya granted hospital's motion for summary 
judgment and dismissed Robinson's complaint because she failed to 
introduce expert testimony to establish that her injuries were 
caused by hospital's negligence or to sholw that the doctrine of 
res ipsa loquitur was an appropriate theolry. Judge Sawaya1 s 
order complies with decisions by this Court requiring that 
plaintiffs in medical malpractice cases establish through expert 
testimony that either the defendant is negligent or that res ipsa 
loquitur applies. 
This Court has consistently held that plaintiffs in 
medical malpractice actions must introduce expert testimony to 
establish (1) the standard of care, (2) defendant's failure to 
comply with that standard and (3) that defendant's action caused 
the injuries alleged. The purpose of thife requirement is to 
assist the trier of fact in deciding medical/legal issues which 
are usually outside the experience and understanding of the 
average citizen. Nixdorf v. Hicken, 612 J>.2d 348, 352 (Utah 
1980) . 
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The only exception to this general rule is when the 
propriety of treatment is within the common knowledge and 
experience of laymen. in such cases, which typically involve the 
loss of a surgical instrument or other paraphernalia at the 
operating site, expert testimony is unnecessary to establish the 
standard of care or a breach of that standard because the same is 
obvious to lay persons. _Kl_ at 352; see also Kim v. Andersen, 610 
P.2d 1270, 1271 (Utah 1980). 
At summary jugment Robinson introduced no expert 
testimony that her infection was caused by hospital's breach of 
the appropriate standard of care. instead, Robinson argued that 
by merely pleading the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, she was 
entitled to take her case to a jury. 
A. Res Ipsa Loquitur is Not Appropriate in this Case Because 
Robinson Failed to introduce Expert Medical Testimony to 
Establish that Her infection Was More Likely the Result of 
the Hospital's Negligence than Some Other Cause. 
judge Sawaya properly granted hospital's motion for 
summary judgment and dismissed Robinson's complaint because 
Robinson failed to establish, with appropriate evidence, that res 
ipsa loquitur is applicable in this case. In Nixdorf, this Court 
held that plaintiffs in medical malpractice actions may employ 
tne doctrine of res ipsa loquitur to carry the burden of 
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establishing negligence only "when the appropriate evidentiary 
basis is presented . . . ." Nixdorf at 352. In specifying the 
type of evidentiary basis plaintiffs are required to establish, 
this Court declared: 
We delineated the evidentiary foundation which 
the plaintiff must establish before employing 
the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur in Moore v. 
James when we stated: 
The rule • • . is applicable when: (1) 
The accident was of a kind which, in the 
ordinary course of events, would not have 
happened had the defendant used due care, 
(2) the instrument or thing causing the 
injury was at the time of the accident 
under the management and control of the 
defendant, and (3) the accident happened 
irrespective of any participation at the 
time by the plaintiff. 
Id. at 352-53 (quoting Moore v. James, 5 Utah 2d 91, 96, 297 P.2d 
221, 224 (1956). 
This Court recently affirmed this holding in Kusy v. K-
Mart Apparel Fashion Corp., 681 P.2d 1232, 1235 (Utah 1984) when 
it described this evidentiary foundation as the "well-defined 
circumstances" which permit reliance upon the doctrine of res 
ipsa loquitur. Furthermore, Nixdorf emphasized that expert 
testimony is generally required to establish the preliminary 
evidentiary base for invoking the doctrine. It was declared 
that: 
The establishment of this evidentiary basis 
presents a peculiar problem to a plaintiff in 
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a medical malpractice case because of the 
necessity of showing what the usual outcome of 
a medical procedure would be when the required 
due care is employed. Generally, this 
requires the introduction of expert medical 
testimony to establish the fact the outcome" is 
more likely the result of negl^g^nce than some 
other cause. This testimony would be 
necessary to provide the evidentiary basis 
from which the jury could conclude the result 
is more probably than not due to the neglience 
of the attending physician. 
Nixdorf at 353 (emphasis added). See also, Kelly v> Hartford 
Casualty insurance Co., 271 N.W.2d 676 (Wis. 1978) where res ipsa 
loquitur instruction was not required "because there was no 
direct medical testimony to prove that the injury was of a nature 
that ordinarily occurs except for the lack of proper skill and 
care. . ." and Chiero v. Chicago Osteopathic Hospital, 392 N.E.2d 
203, 210 (111. App. Ct. 1979) where summary judgment for 
defendant was granted in spite of plaintiff's invocation of res 
ipsa loquitur because plaintiff failed to show through expert 
testimony that air embolism and resultant cardiac arrest would 
not have occurred in the absence of negligence. 
Plaintiff's argument that she is entitled to take her 
claims to trial merely because she plead res ipsa loquitur has no 
basis in the laws of this or any other state. Even the 
authorities cited in Robinson's brief hold that before she is 
entitled to a res ipsa loquitur instruction she must produce 
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evidence that negligence is the more probable explanation for her 
injuries. Restatement (Second) of Torts §328D, comment e (1966) 
("The plaintiff's burden of proof (in a |:es ipsa case) requires 
him to produce evidence . . .") ; Newing v. Cheatham, 124 Cal. 
Rptr. 193 (Cal. 1975) (plaintiff must introduce evidence that 
defendant is probably the one responsible); Cummins v. City of 
West Linn, 536 P.2d 455, 458 (Or. 1975) (plaintiff must establish 
that the probability of a negligent caus^ of the accident exceeds 
the probability of a non-negligent cause). 
Robinson's own authorities support Judge Sawaya's order 
granting summary judgment on the grounds that Robinson introduced 
no evidence, expert or otherwise, to establish that the 
hospital's negligence was the likely cause of her injury. 
B. The Medical/Legal Issues Involved In Injection-Related 
infection Cases Such as This Are Not Within the Common 
Knowledge of Laymen. 
On rare occasions a medical malpractice plaintiff may 
establish the applicability of res ipsa loquitur by showing 
evidence that the injury is so obviously negligent that laymen 
would know from their common knowledge and experience that it 
could not have occurred without negligenc|e. In Talbot v. Dr. W. 
H. Groves, Latter-day Saints Hospital, 21 Utah 2d 73, 440 P.2d 
872 (1968) this Court upheld a directed verdict in favor of a 
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hospital because the plaintiff had introduced no expert testimony 
that res ipsa loquitur was appropriate and had also failed to 
show that laymen would know from their common experience that the 
hospital was negligent. The Illinois Supreme Court reached a 
similar conclusion in Spidle v. Steward, 402 N.E.2d 216, 224 
(111. 1980). The Spidle court declared that: 
. . .the inference of negligence in a res ipsa 
loquitur case must be based on more than 
speculation. It is drawn from the happening 
of the accident, and there must be common 
knowledge or expert testimony that when such 
an accident occurs, it more probably than not 
is a result of negligence. 
Id. at 224. 
Where the application of res ipsa loquitor was found to 
be appropriate (Kim and Nixdorf, supra) it was because the 
defendant's negligence was clear, egregious and obvious to 
laymen. Kim posed the question of whether it was negligent for a 
dentist to drop a drill bit down a patient's throat. The 
critical issue in Nixdorf was whether it was negligent for a 
surgeon to leave a surgical instrument in the patient's body and 
then fail to inform the patient. in both cases, a lay jury could 
conclude from practical experience and common sense that the 
defendant's actions were negligent and had caused the injuries 
complained of. 
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In this case, however, issues Of negligence and 
causation are significantly more difficult, particularly since 
Robinson's injury could have occurred in the absence of 
negligence. Whether plaintiff's pre-existing Beta Streptococcus 
group "A" tonsillar bacteria spread to and colonized the 
injection site in the plaintiff's left buttocks area is not 
within the common knowledge of a lay jury. Common sense is 
simply not enough to determine the issuer 
At the time of summary judgment hospital established 
that the injections, which Robinson alleged had caused her 
injury, were given in accordance with hospital protocol, 
appropriate standards of care and procedures necessary to ensure 
sterility. Hospital also introduced competent evidence that none 
of the nurses who administered the injections were infected with 
a Beta Streptococcus Group "A" infection and that only pre-
packaged single-lot injections were given, thereby reducing the 
risk of infection to a minimum. Finally, hospital showed that 
tissues from the Robinson's tonsils were infected with a Beta 
Streptococcus Group "A" bacteria and introduced Dr. Burke's 
testimony that he had seen ten similar cases occur in the absense 
of negligence (R. at 177, p. 14, para. 19|) . 
Moreover,it has generally been held that the doctrine 
o f
 res ipsa loquitur is not applicable in injection-related 
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infection cases such as this because the issues involved therein 
are not within the common knowledge of laymen, 
in a case almost directly on point, the Michigan Court 
of Appeals held that the issue of negligence in an injection-
related infection case should not go to the jury on the doctrine 
of res ipsa loquitur, in Rohdy v. James Decker Munson Hospital, 
170 N.W.2d 67 (Mich. Ct. App. 1969) the plaintiff had contracted 
a staphylococcus infection at the site of an injection 
administered by a hospital employee. At the close of trial, the 
court set aside the jury's verdict for the plaintiff granting a 
judgment notwithstanding the verdict. 
The appellate court found that the evidence presented 
at trial had been insufficient to allow the jury to decide the 
issue without speculation and conjecture. This holding was based 
in part upon the fact that there had been evidence presented at 
trial that the plaintiff's "husband was in the association of 
persons who had staphylococcus." id. at 68. The court concluded 
that the "mere occurrence of an infection is not enough to imply 
negligence", particularly when the infection could have occurred 
without negligence. Id. 
Dr. Burke's testimony, that Robinson's infection was 
probably spread from her throat to the injection site by someone 
handling her left buttocks, makes the Rohdy decision particularly 
relevant in light of Robinson's testimony that, on two occasions 
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following her tonsillectomy and prior to her discharge from 
hospital, her husband climbed into bed with her and "touched me 
all over" (R. at 175, p. 57, para, 2). 
Robinson cites Wolfsmith v. Marsh, 337 P.2d 70 (Cal. 
1959) in support of her claim that expert testimony is not 
necessary to establish that an injection-related injury was 
caused by negligence. Contrary to Robinson's argument, Wolfsmith 
does not hold that instance of infection following a hypodermic 
needle injection is within the common knowledge of laymen. 
Wolfsmith is a nerve injury case that has been distinguished from 
injection-related infection cases by subsequent California 
decisions. Contreras v. St. Lukes Hospital, 144 Cal. Rptr. 647, 
656 (Cal. Ct. App. 1978). 
Also, Wolfsmith has not even been followed in 
subsequent nerve injury cases. See LeMere v. Goren 43 Cal. Rptr 
898, 903 (Cal. Ct. App. 1965), where the court held that whether 
an injection related injury is caused by negligence* is not within 
the common knowledge of laymen and Campos v. Weeks, 53 Cal. Rptr. 
915, 918 (Cal. Ct. App. 1966) where it was held that expert 
testimony is necessary before an injection-related nerve injury 
case can go to the jury. 
This court should completely disregard Wolfsmith 
because the case at hand involves an injection-related infection 
rather than a nerve injury. Even if the injury complained of in 
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the present case were a nerve injury, Wolfsmith would not be 
controlling because subsequent California cases have held that 
even nerve injury cases require expert testimony to establish 
that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is applicable. 
C* judge Sawaya Acted properly When He Summarily Dismissed 
Robinson's Complaint, Because He Was Required to Rule as a 
Matter of Law that Res Ipsa Loquitur Was Not Appropriate. 
Summary judgment is the time for parties to establish 
that they can prove their case at trial. In medical malpractice 
actions the lack of supporting expert testimony entitles the 
defendant to judgment as a matter of law. By failing to 
establish through expert testimony that the doctrine of res ipsa 
loquitur was applicable or by showing that hospital's negligence 
was obvious, Robinson subjected her claims to summary 
dismissal. Marsh v. pemberton, 10 Utah 2d 40, 347 P.2d 1108 
(1959); Jennings v. Stoker, 652 P.2d 912 (Utah 1982); and Baxter 
v. Snow, 78 Utah 217, 2 P.2d 257 (1931). 
As previously argued plaintiffs who plead res ipsa 
loquitur must establish that the doctrine is applicable or be 
dismissed. In Chiero v. Chicago Osteopathic Hospital, 392 N.E.2d 
203 (111. App. Ct. 1979) plaintiff plead the applicability of res 
ipsa loquitur but failed to show that negligence was obvious or 
to establish the appropriateness of the doctrine through expert 
testimony. The appellate court affirmed the summary judgment 
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entered below. Contrary to Robinson's unsupported contention, 
that court held that summary judgment was appropriate even though 
res ipsa loquitor had been plead. The court ruled that: 
Proof of a bad result or mishap is not, in 
and of itself, evidence of lack of skill or 
negligence . . . and it will not, standing 
alone, support a res ipsa loquitur cause of 
action . . . . in light of the above circum-
stances, we findTthat plaintiff's invocation 
of the res ipsa loquitur doctrine does not 
preclude the entry of summary judgment for the 
defendants. 
Id. at 210 (emphasis added). 
Robinson had every opportunity to produce contrary 
expert testimony to establish a disputed fact as to the 
appropriateness of the care rendered or as to the applicability 
of the doctrine. Robinson failed to do so and summary judgment 
was appropriate. Hill v. Durkin, 374 N.Ei.2d 1147 (111. App. Ct. 
1978)1.. 
1
 "Where, however, the record indicates that plaintiff has 
had every opportunity to establish his case and has 
failed to demonstrate that he could show negligent acts 
or omissions by defendant by expert medical testimony, 
where the issue is clearly one which cannot be 
determined by laymen alone, summary judgment could be 
allowed." 
Id. at 1151. 
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D. There Are No Genuine Factual issues as to the Applicability 
of the Doctrine of Res Ipsa Loquitur Which judge Sawaya 
Should Have Reserved for the Jury, 
Robinson **-gues that there were substantial factual 
issues in dispute as to whether the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur 
was applicable. She refers specifically to the deposition 
testimonies of Dr. Jackson, Julie jacobson and Dr. Cole. 
Robinson indicates that Dr. Jackson testified that he 
did not believe there was a significant risk that the bacteria 
present in plaintifffs tonsils would be seeded in her blood 
stream. Although Dr. Jackson believed the risk of plaintiff's 
tonsillar infection spreading to her buttocks through her 
bloodstream was not significant, he declared that it was 
possible. Most significant is his summary statement that the 
infection in Robinson's buttocks was not caused by hospital's 
negligence. Dr. Jackson specifically testified that: 
And the care was marvelous. I don't think there is any-
any blame to be placed on anyone, as far as the care 
is concerned, the nurse, the doctor, or anybody. 
(R. at 174, p. 34, para. 1-4). 
Robinson further contends that Julie jacobson's 
statement that this was a "nosocomial" or "hospital, acquired" 
infection raises a disputed issue as to what she meant. At 
summary judgment hospital introduced evidence that "nosocomial" 
means "relating to a hospital" and is used to describe a disorder 
which occurs or becomes known while a patient is being treated ir 
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a hospital (R. at 126). That Ms. Jacobson used the term in this 
sense is made clear later in her deposition, when she testified 
that rather than being caused by an injection, it was more likely 
that the infection complained of was colonized by an infection 
which Robinson brought into the hospital with her (R. at 175, 
p. 46 f para. 1-10). 
Robinson's brief points to Dr. Cole's statement that on 
the evening of admission he believed the infection was probably 
introduced by a needle. Robinson omits the fact that Dr. Cole 
changed his opinion after a more thorough examination of Robinson 
was conducted. At summary judgment Dr. Cole's testimony was that 
he did not have enough information to give an opinion as to the 
probable cause of Robinson's injury (R. at 78 p. 13 para. 1-8). 
Finally, Robinson contends that there is a material 
issue of fact as to whether Robinson's husband spread the 
infection to the injection site when he handled her buttocks. 
Whether Robinson, her husband or a third Iparty was responsible 
for spreading the infection is not relevamt. Dr. Burke stated 
that Robinson or some person other than hospital "probably spread 
the infection to her buttocks by handling the injection site." 
(R. at 99). That testimony stands unrefuted in the record. 
Robinson had fifteen months before summary judgment to 
obtain expert testimony either substantiating her claims of 
negligence or establishing that res ipsa loquitur applied. Judge 
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Sawaya granted an additional 30 days following the hearing for 
Robinson to obtain such testimony. Robinson failed to produce 
expert medical testimony at summary judgment or to establish an 
evidentiary basis for res ipsa loquitur. Consequently there were 
no disputed issues of fact with regard to whether her infection 
resulted from hospital's negligence and judge Sawaya was correct 
in dismissing Robinson's complaint. 
CONCLUSION 
At the time of summary judgment, Robinson introduced no 
evidence to counter Dr. Burke's sworn testimony that hospital was 
not responsible for her injury and that her own tonsils were the 
source of the infection complained of. This and other competent 
evidence that Robinson's injuries were not caused Dy hospital's 
negligence was never contradicted. judge Sawaya was correct in 
ruling that res ipsa loquitur was not applicable and in 
dismissing plaintiff's complaint. This order should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted this day of February, 1985f 
Salt Lake City, Utah. 
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